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ABSTRACT 
 
In times of drought, mandatory water restrictions are a popular option for local governments to 
prevent water shortages.  The state of South Carolina has had mandatory water restrictions in 
various counties for nearly a third of the past decade.  If there are heterogeneous consumers with 
varying marginal valuations for water, these mandatory restrictions may be economically 
inefficient.  I calculate what welfare gains could be achieved for the state by allowing prices to 
fluctuate instead of imposing mandatory restrictions. 
 
To perform this calculation, I assume a basic quadratic demand function for water with constant 
income elasticity.  The water restrictions force all consumers down the demand curves to a lower 
quantity than they would otherwise consume.  The percentage of this movement along the 
demand curves is taken from previously calculated reductions in water usage due to restrictions 
shown in the literature.  I estimate the net welfare loss for the state by the mandatory restrictions.  
I then calculate the estimated welfare gains of allowing trade across counties. 
 
To perform these calculations, I have gathered data on residential water usage in every county 
within South Carolina for 2005.  In addition, I have per capita income and population values for 
each county.  I use the income elasticity of demand for water of .25 based on studies in North 
Carolina.  I use data from Agthe and Billings 1987 paper to estimate a functional relationship 
between income and price elasticity, which is then applied to each county to estimate the county‟s 
price elasticity.  Based on pricing data obtained across the state, I use a fixed price for water. 
 
My analysis finds a welfare loss of around 20% of the overall expenditures on water.  I calculate 
the gains from trade to be initially around only 3% of the overall welfare loss.  Subsequent 
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evaluations reveal that this value is sensitive to the overall variance among the counties‟ price 
elasticities.  If demand for water varies enough among counties or trades among individuals are 
feasible, then welfare recovery appears to be a viable option.  However, if the costs to create such 
a market are high, then such an effort appears inefficient. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Throughout the eastern United States, rainfall has been at record-setting lows from 2007 to 2009.  
In fact, according to Ryan Broyles, North Carolina‟s state climatologist, the Carolinas 
experienced what may have been the worst drought in nearly 800 years based on tree ring data. 
(Shapley)  In many instances, the response of local governments has been to impose either 
mandatory or voluntary water restrictions.  Although, rationing of a scarce good is rarely 
economically efficient, many governments choose to ration water during times of shortages and 
drought.   
 
It is interesting (if unsurprising) that voluntary restrictions have been shown to provide little in 
terms of actual reductions in water consumption.  In their study of counties that implemented 
voluntary restrictions during the 2002 drought in Colorado, Kenney, Klein, and Clark found 
reductions of less than 10% in expected use and only 4% in actual per capita use. (Kenney)  In 
their same study, mandatory restrictions served to reduce consumption by substantially more - 
between 18 and 56 percent.  However, while mandatory rationing does succeed in reducing 
consumption, it is not clear what sorts of inefficiencies are introduced as a result of the rationing. 
 
As of February 7, 2008 approximately 9% of South Carolina‟s population was under mandatory 
restrictions and 60% was under voluntary restrictions. (South Carolina State Climatology Office)  
I will use a model to estimate the loss of surplus to the state of South Carolina for similar water 
restrictions in times of drought.  To do so I will look at existing studies of the price elasticity of 
demand for water, income elasticity of demand for water, and a basic demand curve.  After 
estimating the loss from restrictions, I will discuss what sort of steps could be taken to attempt to 
recover these costs.   
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LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Much work has been done in the past estimating elasticities of water prices.  Howe and 
Linaweaver were some of the original water resource economists to estimate the demand for 
water in 1967. (Howe)  They used multi-city cross-sectional data to determine the demand for 
indoor and outdoor water use.  Among their conclusions, they discovered that indoor (domestic) 
demand was relatively price inelastic while outdoor was price elastic.  Outdoor demand was not 
as elastic in the Western U.S. as in the East.  They also estimated the weighted average of 
elasticity of total demand to be -0.4.   
 
In 1997, Espey, Espey, and Shaw performed a meta-analysis to determine what factors 
systematically affected price elasticity estimates of US residential water demand. (Espey)  They 
used 124 price elasticity estimates as the dependent variable and included many explanatory 
variables, such as functional form, location, water price specification, season, etc.  The average 
price elasticity estimate among their data sets was -0.51.    
 
Their conclusions are that income, rainfall, evapotranspiration, pricing structure, and season all 
influence the estimate of price elasticity.  Significant impacts were seen as summer demand was 
much more elastic than average demand (and vice versa for winter).  Pricing structure proved to 
be one of the most significant factors in their study as models using average price, D price, or 
Shin price or in areas of increasing block rates found significantly more elastic demand.  They 
also find that commercial demand is more elastic than residential demand.  In addition, 
discussions with Molly Espey provided information on additional studies showed an income 
elasticity of water of .25 in North Carolina. 
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Espey, Espey, and Shaw had their work expanded on in 2003 by Dalhuisen, Florax, de Groot, and 
Nijkamp with another meta-analysis. (Dalhuisen)  They add a substantial amount of additional 
data from studies since the original meta-analysis was performed as well as including income 
elasticities.    They also find that there is a substantial effect with different pricing structures 
(primarily increasing block rate pricing).  Higher absolute values of prices and income elasticities 
are found when prices different from marginal prices are used.  In addition, the differences in 
estimated elasticities are positively correlated with differences in per capita income.   
 
In a 1987 study, Agthe and Billings estimated a simultaneous equation model of demand for 
households in four income groups to determine the price elasticity of demand for each group. 
(Agthe) Under the existing increasing block rate pricing schedules, higher income households use 
more water and have lower elasticities of demand.  Their groups were set up with four income 
brackets of $0-$10k, $10k-$20k, $20k-$35k, and $35k+.  The price elasticities for these groups 
were found to be -.565, -.49, -.46, and -.397 respectively. 
  
Kennedy, Klein, and Clark investigated the question of what impacts water restrictions have on 
actual consumption during a drought in Colorado in the summer of 2002. (Kenney)  They tracked 
the water savings achieved by eight water providers based on comparisons of usage in 2002 to 
2000 and 2001.  Mandatory restrictions were highly effective at reducing water consumption and 
resulted in per capita savings between 18 and 56 percent.  Voluntary restrictions resulted only in 
savings of 4 to 12 percent.  
 
The volume of work estimating price and income elasticities of demand for water is not 
surprising given water‟s critical role in human survival.  However, there is a surprising lack of 
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work that has been done to examine the welfare costs of water rationing.  I will discuss one such 
study that was undertaken in Sydney, Australia but have been unable to find similar research 
performed in the United States. 
 
Grafton and Ward perform a demand-based analysis of the welfare impacts of mandatory water 
restrictions placed on over 75 percent of Australians as of March 2008. (Grafton)  They attempt 
to measure the loss in Marshallian surplus to the city of Sydney, Australia due to restrictions over 
the period of 2004-2005.  The restrictions they estimated reduced overall quantity consumed by 
approximately 14%. 
 
They use the rainfall and temperature data for Sydney in an estimated model to predict the annual 
demand for these years.  Based on this demand estimate, they calculate the market-clearing price 
at $2.35/kL that would induce the total quantity demanded to equal the quantity used under 
restrictions.  This price allows them to integrate the inverse demand curve between the quantity 
consumed at the actual price and this market-clearing price to calculate the loss. 
 
They use a choke price of $5.05/kL to cap the otherwise infinite loss, above which they assume 
alternate means of gathering water (such as rain barrels) will be used.  The resulting estimate is a 
loss to the city of Sydney of about $235 million over a 12-month period.  This comes to a $55 
loss per capita and $150 loss per household.  Based on their data, this was almost half of the 
average water bill in 2005.   
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THEORY 
 
I begin the theoretical discussion with the understanding that water is a normal good and follows 
the law of demand.  I also assume that there are either heterogeneous consumers (with regards to 
marginal valuations of water) or that there exist different marginal values of water for different 
uses that are restricted by the rationing.  In this case, mandatory restrictions placed on water will 
impose a welfare cost because consumers cannot equate the marginal cost of water to its marginal 
benefit.   
 
In Figure 1, I assume a single county imposes water restrictions and want to calculate the costs of 
these restrictions.  I use an ordinary demand curve as an estimate of consumer surplus instead of 
compensated demand curves.   
 
 
Figure 1: Demand curve and welfare loss with restrictions (One county) 
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In Figure 1, P0 is the initial price of water, and Q0 is the initial consumption. The water restriction 
shifts consumption back to QR at price PR. Consumers will consequently spend less on water. This 
reduction in expenditures is shown by the area labeled S1. However, consumers lose surplus as 
well as shown by the dead weight loss area, S0.  There is an additional welfare loss imposed by 
the costs of enforcement that is not captured here.   
 
The shadow price of water at QR is the demand price or marginal valuation along the demand 
curve. To the extent that consumers are heterogeneous, the shadow price under water restrictions 
will vary across consumers. Because of this, there are potential gains-from-trade holding the total 
amount of water consumed to the restricted level. This is shown in Figure 2 for two consumer 
groups using a pair of ordinary demand curves to show consumer surplus.   
 
Figure 2: Welfare Gains from Trade (Two Counties) 
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The demand curves DL and DH represent one county with relatively low demand for water and 
one with relatively higher demand for water.  P0 is the observed price of water.  The quantities  
and   are what the hypothetical demand for water would have been at price P0 absent 
restrictions.  
  
Prices PH and PL are where the quantity of water actually demanded equals the amount consumed 
under the restrictions at  and .  The value at P1 is the equilibrium price between these 
counties so that  where  and are the quantities demanded at P1 for 
the low and high demanding counties respectively.  
 
The overall welfare loss for the low-demanding county is equal to S0 + S1.  Similarly, the loss for 
the high-demanding county is S2 + S3.  The potential gain from trade of the low-demanding 
county selling water to the higher-demanding county is the value of S0.  Likewise, the high-
demanding county can gain value shown by S2 by purchasing water at a quantity equal to 
.  
 
The calculation of these potential gains from trade is the object of this thesis.  I use differences in 
water consumption across the counties in South Carolina as my measure of consumer 
heterogeneity.  Note that given the functional form selected (constant elasticity) and the constant 
reduction in water usage, in order for there to be gains from trade between heterogeneous 
consumers; they must have different price elasticities. 
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My first step is to specify the demand function for each county.  I use a standard functional form 
with constant elasticity where quantity demanded is a function of price, income, and price and 
income elasticity of demand as in Equation 1. 
       (1) 
 
Here Q is the quantity of water demanded, A is a constant, P is the price of water, Ed is the price 
elasticity of water, M is the average income for the county, and Ei is the income elasticity of 
demand for water. 
 
Each county must have an estimate of the price elasticity of demand.  To accomplish this, I use 
the data provided by Agthe and Billings in their aforementioned 1987 study.  After converting the 
income blocks to 2010 income levels, I estimate the following relationship between price 
elasticity (Ed) and income (M) and solve for two constants, X1 and X2: 
   
       (2) 
 
Applying this equation to the income level of each county in South Carolina allows me to 
calculate a separate price elasticity estimate for each county.  As previously discussed, I note that 
the estimate income elasticity of demand for water means .  Given the price of water and 
the income for each county in South Carolina, I then solve for the coefficient of the demand 
function on a per county basis. 
 
I then find the inverse demand function P, as a function of quantity demanded (Q), a constant (A), 
income (M), price elasticity (Ed), and income elasticity (Ei) shown in Equation 3: 
 
       (3) 
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I will integrate this function to obtain the area under the demand curves for the current welfare 
loss calculation and future welfare recovery calculations.  The indefinite form is shown in 
Equation 4.   
 
   (4) 
 
By calculating the definite integral from QR to Q0 (where QR is the reduced quantity due to 
restrictions and Q0 is the original quantity consumed) I can obtain the entire shaded area in Figure 
1.  I then subtract the area S1 to acquire the overall welfare loss (WL) from the restrictions shown 
in Equation 5. 
 
  
 (5) 
 
 
This calculation is then performed on each of the 46 counties in South Carolina to obtain 
the overall welfare loss that would be imposed by statewide restrictions.  Now that I have 
obtained the overall welfare loss, I want to find what percentage of that can be recaptured 
by allowing trade between counties. 
 
To accomplish this I first calculate the quantity used by the average household in each 
county under the restrictions, and also the quantity used for the entire county, Qr.  Using 
the inverse demand function (Equation 3), I solve for the equilibrium price Pr under 
restrictions based on income and elasticity.  
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The constraining assumption behind allowing trade is that the total quantity of water 
consumed after all trade is complete must be equal to the total quantity consumed under 
the restrictions.  To ensure this, I calculate the quantity consumed after trade by each 
county, QC, shown by Equation 6. 
          (6) 
In this equation, Pop is the county population and HS is the household size in the county.  
A is the constant from the demand equation in Figure 3.  M is income, Ed is price 
elasticity, and Ei is income elasticity.   P1 is a fixed statewide price for water.  After 
calculating the quantity for each county, I iteratively adjust P1 until the statewide quantity 
is equal to the quantity consumed under the restrictions.  After obtaining P1, I then 
calculate the welfare gains from trade, WT, for each county by Equation 7. 
  
   (7) 
 
 
With these welfare gains calculated, I then determine what percent of the overall welfare 
loss can be mitigated by allowing trade to occur by dividing WT by WL from Equation 6. 
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DATA SOURCES 
 
In this study, I gathered data from a number of different sources.  As mentioned previously, the 
estimates for price and income elasticity were gathered from the existing literature.  The data for 
population and overall domestic water withdrawals was obtained from the United States 
Geological (USGS) survey online. (United States Geological Survey)  This data was broken down 
by all 46 counties for the year 2005.   
 
The income data was obtained from the South Carolina Budget and Control Board Statistical 
Abstract for 2005. (South Carolina Budget and Control Board)  In addition, data on average 
household size was needed to convert the per capita income numbers to average household 
income.  This was obtained from data gathered by the US Census Bureau. (United States Census 
Bureau)  The average prices for residential water were obtained from various counties by 
contacting the water districts themselves for their data.  Most of the water districts have lower 
water prices for individuals within city limits than those outside the city.  They also charge 
different rates for different sizes of meter.  However, over 90% of residents in the cities use 5/8” 
meters.  Because of this, I take the in-city prices for 5/8” meters as the average rate.   
 
After collecting around seventy data points for different districts between 2000 and 2010, the 
variations in prices proved to be small enough that I decided to use a single price ($3/1k gal.) for 
each district instead of estimating an average price based on the various water districts in each 
county.   
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RESULTS 
 
After converting the data from the Agthe and Billings study to 2005 dollars, I obtained the 
following estimate of the elasticity of demand in Figure 3. 
 
Figure 3: Estimate of Price Elasticity by Average County Income 
 
The estimate for this relationship is shown below in Equation 8. 
 
        (8) 
 
The following table contains the summary statistics from my dataset including the calculated 
price elasticity and household welfare loss (in dollars and percentage).   
 
Table 1: Data Summary Statistics (Per Household) 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Average Income 46 64,725 10,246 48,310 98,663 
County Water Use (Mgal/day) 46 9.25 9.65 1.01 40.74 
Price Elasticity 46 -0.36 0.04 -0.43 -0.24 
Shadow Price ($/Mgal) 46 8.14 1.13 6.94 13.39 
Total Annual Expenditures ($) 46 281.03 10.30 259.52 301.18 
Welfare Loss ($) 46 56 10 41 100 
Welfare Loss (%) 46 19.9 3.6 15.8 36.5 
Welfare Gains from Trade ($) 46 1.72 2.46 0.0013 15.62 
Welfare Gains from Trade (%) 46 3.12 3.41 0.00 15.57 
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These statistics show that the water use for counties varied from 1 to 40 Mgal/day with an 
average of 9.25 Mgal/day.  The calculated price elasticities of demand varied between -
.24 and -.43 with the average at the midpoint of these at -.36.  The calculated shadow 
prices (PR in figure 1) varied between 7 and 13 dollars/1000 gallons.  This was a very 
high increase from the observed rate of 3 dollars/1000 gallons.   
 
The average welfare cost per household proved to be nearly $56 annually, which was 
almost 20% of their average water bill.  The average individual in the county affected the 
most lost as much as 36.5% of their overall expenditures.  The total average cost per 
household was around $281/month.  For the entire state, this equates to an overall loss 
caused by restrictions of $102.4 million.  By way of comparison, the aforementioned 
Grafton and Ward study found a $150 loss per household for a total of nearly 50% of the 
total water bill. (Grafton)   
 
I calculate initially that allowing counties to trade would provide an overall recovery of the 
welfare losses equal to around 3%.  This equates to the recovery of around $2 per household 
or approximately $2.27 million state-wide.  Given the initial elasticity estimates, it does 
not appear that a significant amount of this loss can be recaptured by allowing individual 
counties to trade.   
 
Shown in Table 2 are the top and bottom five counties in terms of overall water usage per 
household.  The usage amounts are listed in thousands of gallons and span from a high of 
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100,400 gallons for Berkeley and Jasper Counties to a low of 86,500 gallons in Horry 
County.  The restricted usage is estimated at 70% of the unrestricted usage. 
 
Table 2: Top and Bottom Five Counties in Average Household Usage 
County 
Annual Usage 
(1000s Gal) 
Restricted Annual 
Usage (1000s Gal) 
Berkeley 100.4 70.3 
Jasper 100.4 70.3 
Dorchester 99.3 69.5 
Dillon 99.0 69.3 
Williamsburg 98.2 68.7 
Union 88.9 62.3 
Charleston 88.3 61.8 
Oconee 87.6 61.3 
McCormick 87.2 61.0 
Horry 86.5 60.6 
 
In Table 3, I show the top and bottom counties in average household usage after trade 
occurs.  The greatest change occurs as Beaufort county moves from one of the lowest 
usage counties into the very top spot.  
 
Table 3: Top and Bottom Five Counties in Usage after Trade 
County 
Usage after trade 
(1000s Gal) 
Beaufort 71.3 
Berkeley 71.0 
Dorchester 69.4 
York 69.1 
Jasper 68.5 
Allendale 59.6 
Abbeville 59.6 
Union 59.4 
Horry 58.7 
McCormick 55.8 
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Table 4 more explicitly shows the changes in terms of overall usage.  As mentioned, 
Beaufort experiences an 11.2% increase in the overall amount of water usage and 
Charleston and Lexington both increase by over 3%.  The lower-demanding counties of 
McCormick and Allendale both use more than 8% less water than before allowing trades.   
 
Table 4: Top and Bottom Five Counties in Usage Percentage Change 
County 
Household Change  
(1000s Gal) 
Percentage                      
Change 
Beaufort 7.16 11.2% 
Charleston 2.74 4.4% 
Lexington 2.41 3.7% 
York 1.88 2.8% 
Greenville 1.71 2.7% 
Bamberg -4.53 -6.8% 
Marlboro -4.53 -6.8% 
Barnwell -4.73 -7.2% 
McCormick -5.27 -8.6% 
Allendale -5.68 -8.7% 
 
 
We would expect that the counties that have the greatest welfare loss imposed on them by 
the restrictions (Table 5 below) would closely mirror those that purchase more water 
usage (shown in Table 4).  This is borne out by the data as four of the heaviest affected 
counties are in the top five (Beaufort, Charleston, Lexington, and York) of those that 
attempt to trade to recover some of the restricted water usage.   
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Table 5: Top Ten Counties in Welfare Loss 
County Welfare Loss ($) Percent Loss 
Beaufort 100.33 36.5% 
Lexington 70.29 25.1% 
York 69.50 24.1% 
Charleston 68.68 25.9% 
Berkeley 67.70 22.5% 
Georgetown 66.12 23.7% 
Greenville 65.05 24.1% 
Dorchester 63.82 21.4% 
Florence 63.16 22.3% 
Kershaw 62.92 22.3% 
 
The top ten counties in Table 6 indicate those that stand to recover the greatest amount 
from trades.  The gains from trade are measured in dollars per household and also as a 
percentage of the overall average household expenditures on water.  This list is a 
combination of those counties that both buy and sell water.  Interestingly, the only county 
on this list that is a net importer of water is Beaufort.  All of the rest of the counties that 
have the highest amount of potential gains from trade are net exporters of water.  
Table 6: Top Ten Counties in Mitigation 
County 
Gains from  
Trade ($) 
Gains from  
Trade (%) Welfare Loss ($) Welfare Loss (%) 
Beaufort 15.62 15.6% 100.33 36.5% 
Allendale 4.94 11.2% 44.26 15.8% 
McCormick 4.55 11.0% 41.45 16.8% 
Barnwell 3.53 7.6% 46.62 16.6% 
Williamsburg 3.25 6.5% 49.71 16.9% 
Marlboro 3.24 6.8% 47.62 16.9% 
Bamberg 3.18 6.8% 47.01 16.8% 
Marion 3.11 6.3% 48.94 15.9% 
Lee 3.06 6.1% 50.04 17.0% 
Abbeville 2.64 5.7% 46.66 17.1% 
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One key question I must answer is how sensitive the model is to changes in the impacts 
assumed by the water restrictions.  In Table 7, I show the changes in overall welfare loss 
and gains from trade by changing the quantity of water the reductions conserve.  I test the 
impacts on the model of reductions ranging from 20%-40%.  The change in overall 
welfare loss per household fluctuates from around $21 (7% of the total expenditure on 
water) to the high point of almost $123 (nearly 44% of total expenditures).  Note that the 
upper estimates of the welfare loss are very close to the impacts found in the Grafton and 
Ward study.   
Table 7: Sensitivity Analysis of Changes in Reduction Percentage 
Reduction (%) 
Welfare 
Loss ($) 
Welfare 
Loss (%) 
Gains from 
Trade ($) 
Gains from 
Trade (%) 
20 20.82 7.41 0.52 2.53 
25 35.43 12.62 0.98 2.80 
30* 55.95 19.93 1.72 3.12 
35 84.21 29.99 2.90 3.49 
40 122.78 43.73 4.78 3.94 
     * Denotes initial value used. 
The second key sensitivity analysis I perform relates to the variance among the 
elasticities.  As the variance among price elasticities increases, so do the potential gains 
from trade.  Therefore, I evaluate the model using equations that cause both more and 
less dispersion among the price elasticity estimates.  The results are shown below in 
Table 8.  The coefficient and constant values refer to the numerical values in Equation 8. 
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Table 8: Sensitivity Analysis of Elasticity Changes 
Coefficient Constant 
Elasticity 
Min 
Elasticity 
Max 
Gains from 
Trade ($) 
Gains from 
Trade (%) 
1.69E-06 -.0403 -0.24 -0.32 0.77 1.05 
3.72E-06* -.0605 -0.24 -0.43 1.72 3.12 
8.18E-06 -1.03 -0.22 -0.63 3.09 7.61 
1.12E-05 -1.21 -0.11 -0.67 13.54 17.19 
  * Denotes initial values used. 
The original model is shown in the second line with elasticities varying between -.24 and 
-.43.  This resulted in gains from trade for each household of around 3.12% of the welfare 
loss.  Decreasing the distribution of the elasticities to vary between -.24 and -.32 lowers 
the gains from trade to only 1.05% of the overall welfare loss.  More interestingly, if we 
increase the spread to vary between -.22 and -.63 the gains from trade increase to 7.62% 
of the welfare loss.  The largest differences in the elasticity equation I test results in the 
county elasticities varying between -.11 and -.67.  This results in gains from trade of 
$13.54 per household at a recovery rate of over 17%.  As expected this increasing 
variation of elasticities results in much greater gains from trade among counties.   
 
I took Aiken County (as the largest county that realized no gains from trade) and 
evaluated the top and bottom 10% of income.  The bottom 10% of households had 
income below $10,000 annually and the top 10% had incomes above $128,000.  Using 
these to estimate price elasticity provides a low value of -.13 and a high value of -.57.  
This is reasonably in-line with the final estimate of gains from trade in Table 7 above 
with the values -.11 and -.67.   
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ANALYSIS 
 
It is certainly the case that governments interfere with water markets at times with different 
purposes than maximizing overall wealth.  I acknowledge this but proposing a solution to that 
issue is beyond the scope of this work.  I will constrain my analysis to attempt to maximize 
overall welfare. 
 
Based on the low amount of welfare recovery possible in my model, it appears that allowing 
counties to trade water does not allow enough of the welfare costs to be recaptured to be 
worthwhile.  It is likely the costs to set up an infrastructure to allow inter-county trading would be 
fairly low but probably not low enough to justify a mere 3% recovery.  However, if we accept the 
elasticity estimates from subsequent tests in the sensitivity analysis, there appear to be enough 
gains from trade to pursue inter-county trading. 
 
In either case, we know that individual consumers will have greater variations in their demand for 
water than the counties as a whole.  Thus, if we allow trading among individuals, a greater 
amount of surplus would be recoverable than just by counties trading.  One would expect an 
efficient market to recapture additional surplus if the rights to water are well-defined, 
enforceable, and transferable.   
 
There are many cases of well-defined water rights including volumes of water, specific share of a 
water body, or the availability of a given quantity at a given location (potentially non-
consumable).  As Anderson and Hill discussed in their study on water rights in the American 
West, enforcement activities and laws were established as the benefits of defining and enforcing 
water rights increased. (Anderson)  The primary challenge to establishing an efficient market for 
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water seems to be transferability.  Two key factors seem to be a part of this challenge – that of 
obtaining information about supply and demand for water and establishing methods of physically 
transferring it. 
 
There are models for easing these challenges in the forms of online markets that have appeared 
within the past decade.  The difficulty of obtaining information is greatly reduced when 
motivated sellers and buyers are able to instantly access the details of water markets by simply 
visiting a website.  One solution would consist of creating a website that facilitates trades of 
volumes of water, access rights to bodies of water, in-stream flows, etc.  This market would 
function like a site similar to Craigslist or Zillow in that geography is a key factor in matching 
sellers and buyers.  This also allows for the resolution of the issue of physical transfers (when 
necessary).  Just as transit costs can be specified at a flat rate with UPS or FedEx, they can also be 
automatically added to trades.  Alternately, this could create the possibility of a secondary market 
for entrepreneurs to step in and provide more efficient methods of transferring water.  
 
In this market, industrial users likely want to trade at a much higher volume and might function 
separately from residential users.  One option would be to allow local water companies to trade 
directly with industrial users.  The keys here are that local water companies must have the ability 
to modify prices for their residential customers to allow for the efficient market price to be 
reached, regardless of the final use of water.  In addition, individuals or entities owning water 
rights are easily able to redirect their resource back to a higher valued purpose.   
 
This concept is similar to new systems springing up to create new market for power.  In New 
South Wales, the government introduced a plan to pay resident up to $10,000 annually for selling 
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power back into the grid from having solar panels installed. (Kraemer)   This particular example 
may not prove to be economically efficient; however, there seems to be a large amount of 
potential cross-over between establishing better markets for these similar resources.   
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CONCLUSION 
 
In this study, I have evaluated the net loss to welfare of water rationing for the state of South 
Carolina.  In addition, I have calculated what proportion of that could be recovered by allowing 
counties to trade water.  The welfare loss calculations of 20% indicate a fairly substantial loss to 
residents of South Carolina.  This leads to the conclusion that there are undoubtedly opportunities 
for gains from trade. 
 
By allowing for counties to trade water, I eliminate a number of potential barriers to setting up an 
infrastructure to allow for the trades to occur.  However, with the similar calculated elasticities 
for the counties based on income, there is not enough variation to obtain large benefits from trade.  
This resulted in findings of only around 3% of the welfare losses being recoverable from trading.   
 
By restricting trades to county-wide averages, we lose some of the benefit of gains from trade by 
averaging out the highest and lowest demanding individuals within those counties.  These 
individuals represent the greatest potential source of benefit but are aggregated away by using the 
county-wide data.  By allowing for the possibility of greater swings in price elasticity of demand I 
find that implementing cross-county trades may prove to be economically beneficial in some 
cases.  In the second analysis I find that over 17% of the welfare losses could be recovered by 
trading.   
 
It should also be recognized that I have taken into account only residential water usage.  I readily 
acknowledge that in all likelihood greater potential exists for gains from trade by including 
industrial, commercial, and agricultural users in a similar evaluation.  This would be a valuable 
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study in the future and I hope that my analysis here might be able to form a basic model on which 
to build further studies. 
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APPENDIX 
 
 
 
Figure 4: SC Drought Conditions on Jan. 29, 2008 (US Drought Monitor Archives) 
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Table 9: Key Statistics by County 
County Pop HHold Size Income 
Water 
Usage 
Abbeville 26.133 2.49 
              
55,056  2.61 
Aiken 150.181 2.54 
              
72,182  15.01 
Allendale 10.917 2.56 
              
48,310  1.09 
Anderson 175.514 2.48 
              
66,881  17.55 
Bamberg 15.880 2.55 
              
53,522  1.59 
Barnwell 23.345 2.57 
              
52,451  2.33 
Beaufort 137.849 2.51 
              
98,663  13.78 
Berkeley 151.673 2.75 
              
74,360  15.17 
Calhoun 15.100 2.54 
              
72,210  1.51 
Charleston 330.368 2.42 
              
82,662  33.04 
Cherokee 53.844 2.53 
              
57,307  5.39 
Chester 33.228 2.62 
              
65,013  3.32 
Chesterfield 43.435 2.54 
              
56,606  4.34 
Clarendon 33.363 2.62 
              
55,717  3.34 
Colleton 39.605 2.62 
              
59,642  3.96 
Darlington 67.346 2.57 
              
66,165  6.73 
Dillon 30.974 2.71 
              
56,504  3.1 
Dorchester 112.858 2.72 
              
71,283  11.29 
Edgefield 25.528 2.66 
              
61,598  2.55 
Fairfield 24.047 2.63 
              
62,925  2.4 
Florence 131.097 2.59 
              
73,779  13.11 
Georgetown 60.983 2.55 
              
77,517  6.1 
Greenville 407.383 2.47 
              
78,445  40.74 
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Greenwood 67.979 2.49 
              
63,423  6.79 
Hampton 21.329 2.64 
              
56,934  2.13 
Horry 226.992 2.37 
              
63,490  22.7 
Jasper 21.398 2.75 
              
65,164  2.14 
Kershaw 56.486 2.58 
              
73,775  5.65 
Lancaster 63.113 2.56 
              
60,314  6.32 
Laurens 70.293 2.55 
              
61,310  7.03 
Lee 20.638 2.68 
              
54,423  2.07 
Lexington 235.272 2.56 
              
80,832  23.53 
McCormick 10.108 2.39 
              
48,515  1.01 
Marion 34.904 2.64 
              
54,080  3.49 
Marlboro 28.021 2.59 
              
53,465  2.8 
Newberry 37.250 2.50 
              
59,753  3.73 
Oconee 69.577 2.40 
              
68,546  6.96 
Orangeburg 92.167 2.58 
              
61,925  9.21 
Pickens 113.575 2.50 
              
61,430  11.36 
Richland 340.078 2.44 
              
76,904  34.01 
Saluda 18.895 2.65 
              
68,018  1.89 
Spartanburg 266.809 2.52 
              
67,173  26.68 
Sumter 105.517 2.68 
              
67,113  10.55 
Union 28.539 2.44 
              
59,526  2.85 
Williamsburg 35.395 2.69 
              
53,813  3.54 
York 190.097 2.63 
              
78,648  19.01 
 
* Pop is total Population in Thousands.  HHold Size is the Average Household Size in the county.  Income 
is the average household income.  Water Usage is the overall county water usage measured in Mgal/year.   
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